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The place of Europe in post-Cold War national mythologies of different 
countries varies widely. In three arguably most dramatic examples, Poland 
rethought itself as “the somehow decentered heart of Catholic Europe” 
(Dayan & Katz, 1994, p. 166), while Russia gave reasons to conclude it 
“leaves the West” (Trenin, 2006, p. 87) and Ukraine stuck with its view of 
Europe as a normative example (Orlova, 2010, p. 26). To what extent does 
this remain true if one is to look empirically at the discourses that currently 
inhabit news media? This paper points out, on the example of the public 
discourses around Euromaidan, to how narratives of Europe are 
instrumentalized in political discussions in the three countries that followed 
very different paths since the collapse of the communist bloc. The 
presentation includes results of qualitative analysis based on an open coding 
approach; the focus rests on the most prestigious news outlets (Rzeczpospolita, 
Gazeta wyborcza; Izvestia, Kommersant; Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Korrespondent) but also 
includes important online blog platforms. 
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The recent mass protest movement in Ukraine, known as Euromaidan, brought 
complicated relations of Eastern and Western Europe once more to the foreground. After a 
lead-up of nerve-racking Brussels-Kyiv negotiations and a clash of sorts with the Kremlin over it, 
thousands of protesters occupied the streets of the Ukrainian capital to protest, among other 
things, against the frozen European integration and for closer ties with the EU. This, in almost 
unanimous consensus of international media and experts, became the only mass movement the 
EU has ever inspired. Apart from the unintended consequences of the Crimea annexation and 
war in Donbas (de facto between Russia and Ukraine), the movement’s initial goal was attained 
with the signing of the Association Agreement and its simultaneous ratification by European 
Parliament and Verkhovna Rada on September 16, 2014. What the media did not so readily report 
about was that with the time the protesters distanced themselves from this initial goal, refocused 
on the internal agenda, and the EU flags, in the end of the day, were seen less often in the streets 
of Kyiv. Still, how could people be ready to risk their lives in brutal clashes with the riot police 
for something that otherwise would seem ridiculous to die for: a trade agreement, Brussels 
bureaucracy, and a union whose members increasingly seem weary of? And why is it not 
happening elsewhere? Research into the recent media coverage is in no way capable of explaining 
everything, but it can offer some clues. 
I suggest inquiring into how Ukrainian influential media constructed Europe against the 
backdrop of how it was done in two other significant countries, Poland and Russia1. The 
comparison helps to make correct inferences from findings that might otherwise lead to false 
conclusions. Moreover, these three countries make an almost ideal case for comparison. With 
their closely intertwined histories and not unrelated cultures, they had few differences in their 
political systems and social life from the end of WWII until the collapse of communism and the 
Soviet Union. However, their paths after 1989-1991, including policies, reforms, approaches to 
democratization and European integration, have been following different directions, which 
enables finding different patterns of media environment. Poland enjoys an insider view from 
within the political Europe, the European Union; both Russia and Ukraine use an outsider optic 
of two different kinds, as Moscow never intended (and would probably never be allowed, due to 
its size and history) to become part of the EU. While Ukraine—the least researched country of 
all three--has seen many U-turns on its long and winding road of European integration. At the 
same time, all three countries lend their relations with Europe as top priority, and perceive the 
self-identification towards Europe as the key to defining their own place in the world (cf. 
Poland’s ideas of “the West’s betrayal” or “coming back to Europe”; Ukraine’s Westernizing and 
nativist projects; Russian Eurasianism). 
                                                          
1 While the semantic complications and contradictions of the notion of Europe will be given due 
consideration in this work, during the actual research a more “ad-hoc” understanding thereof was adopted: 
what the analysed texts and statements imply by “Europe”. 
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All these similarities and differences provide a precise background for finding parallels in 
public spheres of the three countries. I use the conceptualization of the “public sphere” by 
Habermas (1962/2011) as “the sphere of private people come together as public” (p. 27) with 
some reservations (Habermas, 2006) – hence the quotation marks in the title. Although 
“Habermas remains centrally engaged in the project of identifying the still-valuable normative 
ideals of modernity” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 40), the concept of the public sphere has often been 
criticized. Some have argued for an end of the “private/public” divide (Sheller & Urry, 2003); 
others have revised the concept to be able to apply it to the media systems in regions such as 
Southern Europe which do not always quite correspond to the Habermasian model of the public 
sphere (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). This is especially true of Eastern Europe where constellations 
of private and group interests were proposed as an alternative explanation for the functioning of 
the media (Splichal, 2003). It must be recognised that while Habermas’ theory works well for 
setting the standards of normative models and checking just how much reality corresponds to 
them, it may have many weaknesses in explaining realities that do not fit with what is considered 
to be the norm for democracy. 
Yet, recent examples make it necessary to rethink this criticism at least in part. Even in 
rather extreme situations, such as the one unfolding right now in Ukraine, the media strive to 
project their impact when conventional political means appear to be ineffective or exhausted: the 
initial Maidan protest on November 21 (the very day the government announced its decision to 
reverse the nation’s external course) was gathered by one of the most read journalists, Mustafa 
Nayyem, with just two posts (see, e.g., Nayyem, 2013) on his Facebook profile that together were 
shared over 3, 000 times. Another journalist and citizen of Russia Artem Skoropadskii who 
previously worked in a Ukrainian localization of the Russian Kommersant got involved in radical 
politics and became a spokesman for the much demonized “Right Sector” group. Many 
journalists and activists who were associated with Euromaidan have later successfully run for 
parliament in the 2014 snap elections (among them, notably, Mr. Nayyem). The Ukrainian 
protests could even be interpreted as a rebellion of the public sphere against the government that 
tried to ignore it, and this actually seems to be a productive approach for explaining what 
happened. 
This is in many ways similar to the events in Poland during the 1980s; it is beyond the scope 
of this work to review all historical details of those developments, but it is interesting that the 
idea of Europe, and of Poland’s return to it, figured prominently in the protest against the 
Jaruzelski regime before, during, and after the martial law. Just as in other Central European 
countries, this helped Poland to take a lead in the “democratic transition” in the postcommunist 
realm (Carothers, 2002). It has since become commonplace that Poland’s view on Europe is 
determined by identity politics (Cordell, 2002). But the contemporary perception of Europe and 
of Poland’s place in Europe could be most immediately linked to the changes in symbolic 
geography that can be traced back to the “Solidarność” movement and John Paul’s II famous 
visits that offered the Poles a view on “their country as an outpost of Western Europe. They 
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were no longer an extension of the Soviet Union, but the somehow decentered heart of Catholic 
Europe” (Dayan & Katz, 1994, p. 166). The Poles perceive Europe as part of their own lived, 
familial experience: the history of Poland was marked by feeling to be a severed part of Europe 
that strove for reuniting with the “rest of the West” (Michnik, 2003); this attitude is perhaps best 
represented in Czesław Miłosz’s 1959 book Rodzinna Europa (Native Realm in English translation, 
but meaning literally “The Familial Europe”). Rather unsurprisingly, the Polish media system 
became one of the most Westernized in all former Eastern bloc countries (Jakubowicz, 2007). 
This was not the case for Russia whose encounter with Western Europe has always been 
troubled and more multifaceted. Adamovsky (2005) argued that the West orientalized Russia for 
its purposes of economic and political domination. Others found out that the relationship with 
the West created in Russia what some call an “inferiority complex” (Sahni, 1997, p. XIV). 
“Whereas the British mimicked no one but themselves, the Russians were mimicking the French 
and British, to whom, again, they had long felt culturally inferior” (Moore, 2001, p. 120). The 
change in this complicated dynamic of representations has come in earnest after neither 1917 
nor 1991, as the same logic seems to have been recreating itself in Russia’s self-positioning in 
relation to Europe. Since at least the first Putin’s presidency, the West in general, the EU less so, 
is again perceived as a rival, as an adversary—and this is the image the Russian media are 
projecting, too (see Zassoursky, 2005; Kratasjuk, 2006). Russian political scientist Trenin 
recognised already eight years ago: “Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West 
and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system. […] In the past year, Russia has 
begun acting like the great power it was in tsarist times” (Trenin, 2006, pp. 87, 92). However, 
even in the 1990s it did not abandon hopes to resurge—now as a regional power, trying to 
mobilize ethnic Russians on its former imperial periphery for the Russian cause, sometimes 
contrary to their own dispositions (Barrington, Herron & Silver, 2003). Of course, statements 
such as “the majority of the Russian Federation’s population [is] favoring eventual EU 
membership” (Liotta, 2005, p. 79) should apparently be considered with a grain of salt. 
Meanwhile, the internal situation in Russia qualifies the country for what in political science is 
called a “hybrid regime” combining elements of authoritarian rule and a democratic facade with 
ineffective political opposition and low political participation (Ekman, 2009). Sparks and Reading 
(1998) emphasized that, despite many transitional processes, the changes in Eastern Europe in 
many cases were less significant than the continuities, and it is perhaps in Russia that this is most 
clearly the case. 
Within cultural studies and political science some attention has been paid to a general 
perception of Europe in Ukraine as well as its impact on Ukraine’s transformation. Oleksandr 
Hrytsenko has exposed what he called the “creolization” of the imported Western-looking goods 
(so-called “euro-things”: “euro-windows,” “euro-doors,” “euro-renovation”) that, in a new 
consumerist environment, acquire new quality and new meaning, comparable to the ones 
existing within aboriginal “cargo cults” (Hrytsenko, 2001). Olia Hnatiuk (2005) defined the 
Westernization (and Europeanization) project as one of the key identity-building projects in 
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Ukraine, along with the Soviet and nativist ones. Wolczuk (2000a) showed how, in the lack of a 
unifying national project, Ukraine as a “nationalizing state” opted for this Europeanization, this 
reaffirmation of its European identity as a compromise between democratic nationalist groups 
and the ruling post-communist elites. Still, the same author found it possible simultaneously to 
call this Europeanization “declarative” (Wolczuk, 2000b), and nothing has really challenged her 
account until now; perhaps, the fatal November decision of the Yanukovych government 
became the high point of this declarative Europeanization. The events that took place before, 
during, and after the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013 confirmed this 
observation once again, yet also made visible a major discrepancy between the conventional 
policy making in Ukraine and civil society’s aspirations. 
Arguably one of the most interesting research works on the representation of Europe in 
Ukrainian public discourses which also can be applied to other Eastern and at times even Central 
European contexts derives from Dariya Orlova who focused mainly on the EU as a normative 
model in the most popular Ukrainian live political talk shows from 2006 to 2010. According to 
Orlova (2010), in the mediatized political discourse, the following was expressed: 
“‘Europe’ is largely referred to as embodiment of normality and development, advanced 
social and political practices. However, this reference frequently constitutes part of the 
discursive strategies employed by actors of discourse to legitimize or delegitimize certain 
practices and decisions within the Ukrainian context. […] Therefore, ‘Europe’ is mostly 
referred to as a reference point, which evidences that symbolic aspect of references 
dominates over institutional.” (pp. 26 – 27) 
Thus Europe could in the Ukrainian discourse be constructed twofold: 1) as a final 
destination point, and 2) a separate geopolitical entity. 
What all these previous findings leave in the dark is how Europe is shown and seen in the 
press where serious debate is taking place—the media outlets that can have the strongest 
infuence among policy-makers and the most active and empowered social classes. Studies of 
fiction or of popular TV shows give little to no direct view into the core of the political branch 
of the public sphere; however, with the presentation of the results of this research this will 
provide such an opportunity. This is also of considerable importance, as it not only explains to 
some degree the role of media in the large-scale protests in Ukraine, but also puts it into a wider 
regional context and contrasts it against the differences with Russia that has not experienced 
neither European integration nor protests against the government on such scale. It can also 
pinpoint some circumstances of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Additionally, such an 
approach allows understanding what changes occur once a country becomes part of the EU (the 
Polish case). 
The aim and principal research question of this paper is to find out how Europe is 
constructed in the public sphere debates in Ukraine, Russia, and Poland. The most influential 
newspapers—still read by decision-makers and a sign of prestige for middle class--were selected 
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for the analysis. In Ukraine, these include Dzerkalo tyzhnia, an influential liberal weekly 
broadsheet with links to the political forces that can be defined as pro-European or “Orange,” 
and Korrespondent, a liberal weekly magazine associated with values of objective reporting (until it 
changed owners and editorial team very recently). The Russian newspapers analyzed here are a 
pro-Kremlin compact Izvestia and a more balanced Kommersant (both dailies). Gazeta wyborcza, of 
liberal-left orientation, and more conservative and establishment-oriented Rzeczpospolita represent 
Polish media. Additionally, the author added a preliminary analysis of the most prestigious online 
blog platforms where opinion leaders set principal frames for narrating Europe, such as 
Ukraine’s most read blog section at Ukrainska pravda, Russia’s Snob.ru and Dziennik opinii at 
Krytyka polityczna in Poland. This will arguably give a better and more up-to-date overview of the 
three countries’ public spheres and Europe’s place in them. 
The research is based on the method of thematic coding which Jensen (2004) 
summarized as “a loosely inductive categorization […] with reference to various concepts, 
headings, or themes” (p. 247). I also accept a post-positivist approach and consider the 
meaning to be constructed rather than transmitted by the text; Bertrand and Hughes (2005) 
define this tradition as assuming that “a text is not a vessel into which meanings are poured 
for transmission to others, but a structure (or a ‘system of signification’) by which meanings 
are produced within cultural context” (p. 173). It was decided to sample the most recent 
articles published between March 2013 and February 2014, thus giving an overview of the 
entire Euromaidan period and the lead-up to it, but no strict sampling procedure was 
performed given the qualitative character of the methodology applied. Overall, 97 articles 
from 6 newspapers were analyzed, plus 17 blog entries from 3 blog platforms. I tried to 
avoid any preconceptions and develop the categories directly from the material; while 
reading the articles closely, I marked the themes and frames that construct the idea of 
Europe, the repeating themes were then united into categories. If new semantic 
constructions appeared later on, they established a new category. The articles were read and 
analyzed until no new categories appeared and the results demonstrated the expected 
saturation. The analysis was qualitative, not quantitative, and does not represent any 
statistical data. 
Additionally, some interesting particular examples were singled out for consideration 
with discourse analysis approach practiced by Fairclough (2003) and critical discourse 
analysis as described by Wodak and Meyer (2009). According to the latter, “analyzing 
discourse is understood as the systematic attempt to identify patterns in text, link them to 
patterns in the context, and vice versa” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 124), which makes it 
easily compatible with the thematic coding approach. Fairclough (2003) suggested grammar 
and semantic analysis as particular tools to decipher social meanings of texts as well as 
locating “orders of discourse” defined as social practices in their lingu istic aspect (p. 24). 
What is also important, in the view of the scholar, is the discovery of the “assumptions,” 
implications given in the text as “the unsaid,” the universally accepted (ibid., p. 40). The 
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concept of discourse applied in this work also refers to its understanding as “ language […] 
as an element of social life which is dialectically related to other elements. ‘Discourse’ is also 
used more specifically: different discourses are different ways of representing aspects of the 
world” (pp. 214-215). Often, I also used the concept of “narrative” which suggested 
chronologically organized discourse. Both these concepts have been debated and can stir 
much methodological and theoretical argument but are used here as practical ways to 
operate the object of the research—linguistic events aimed at the public and focused on 
Europe—so, I will refrain from walking into theoretical entanglements and accept the 
concepts inasmuch as they are productive for the research. 
Some explanation is provided on Figures 2-4 that organize the data and how they 
should be read. They contain no quantitative findings and simply codify the discourses that 
are present in the newspapers, without referring to their prevalence (as this is not a 
quantitative study). The column width/depth etc. should not be associated with any 
statistical representation; the coloring is for the sake of a clearer understanding. The lower-
tier categories represent more specific themes extracted immediately from the material; the 
upper-tier categories are broader generalizations that unite particular lower-tier categories 
and enable some theoretical conceptualization. 
It is important to note that, in 
spite of the perceived saturation, 
this is still a work in progress. The 
results presented here come from a 
pilot study for a larger doctoral research 
that is simultaneously a part of the 
“Narratives of Europe” research project 
aimed at investigating the relation 
between media and power in Eastern 
Europe. Even within this pilot study, the 
results are somewhat preliminary and 
may be incomplete in details, although 
the general picture could be trusted as 
adequate. 
How, then, does this picture look 
like? The Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian press share a few key features in their coverage of 
Europe. There is certainly an ambiguity concerning what “Europe” means in the analyzed 
articles even in the narrower and most immediate sense (see Figure 1). First of all, Europe is a 
geographical entity: a continent with indefinite yet somehow negotiated limits that define 
whether or not any particular country is European according to an unspoken agreement between 





Figure 1. Europe: Gradations of meanings 
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Europe […] in terms of the HIV prevalence.” This fundamental idea then may be led through 
several rounds of clarification that narrow it further down, as a rule, on the basis of institutional 
criteria. The wider institutional meaning is associated with the Council of Europe (this is what is 
meant in the article “Russia responds to Europe” from Kommersant, Oct 1). One more step closer 
towards a narrower Europe is of course the EU, and it can be concluded that this is what is 
meant by Europe in most articles. In Kommersant, “Europe” occasionally comes to mean the 
European market which is probably also thought to be identical with the EU. And then there is 
an even narrower definition that is perhaps typical for Polish newspapers that meticulously 
define the euro zone as some special kind of Europe: the European hardcore. This distinction 
seems, however, largely irrelevant for the Ukrainian and Russian newspapers. 
Some categories are found in all newspapers. One such theme is what could be referred to 
as “Europe in distress” and includes a depiction of economic and social troubles in the EU. 
Another fundamental narrative of Europe that is present in every newspaper is Europe as unity 
or sometimes subject. While this might end up just mentioning it as a location of the events (the 
continent), most typically Europe is constructed as a political subject, in phrases such as “Europe 
is seriously concerned” (Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Dec 13), or, in the context of external policy, as a 
consolidated geopolitical actor pursuing ends of its own: “Europe begins to understand that its 
Ukraine policy, inflexible and declarative, proved ineffective” (Kommersant, Dec 19). 
 
Figure 2. Categories for Russian media 
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These are virtually all the similarities between the newspapers, and significant differences 
begin here. It is already evident in how newspapers report the crisis. This category arguably 
occupies different amounts of space in different newspapers, which could be seen in the 
diversity of subcategories. While the Ukrainian media only report on some aspects of the 
financial crisis and disagreements within the EU, the Russian newspapers uncover a full-scale 
apocalyptic picture in front of their readers. A Spanish court is granting an early release and 
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financial compensation to 54 dangerous terrorists under the pressure of the European Court of 
Human Rights: “In Spain, terrorists and rapists walk free [vypuskaiut iz turem]” (Izvestia, Oct 25); 
the use of cocaine is spreading in Europe thanks to the crisis, a Roma girl gets deported after she 
was captured by the French police at a school trip, the authority of Brussels is perceived 
illegitimate within member states (Izvestia; Sept 13, Oct 23, Oct 22). Izvestia is especially notorious 
for its overwhelmingly negative and sensationalist coverage of Europe, but, although 
Kommersant’s reporting is far more balanced, it also focuses on the EU’s migration problems, 
crisis of leadership and gloomy economic figures in darker colors than any other sampled 
newspaper: “28 member states comprise the EU, but in none of them citizens are content and 
happy” (Kommersant, Jan 22), one could read in a telling sentence. 
In a strong and striking difference from the journalists from two other countries, Russian 
newspeople often choose to portray Europe as an adversarial agent, as a threat. Brussels and 
Strasbourg act as authoritarian centers that command and exploit member states (Izvestia, Oct 
25); the EU “feels it is an empire” (Izvestia, Nov 1). It is no coincidence the same newspaper 
interviewed French far-right populist leader Marine Le Pen during her visit to Moscow (Jun 25). 
“European bureaucrats are obsessed with a messianic idea of common home, erased borders 
between nations, genders etc. These people perceive themselves and their task very pathetically, 
so most likely will sulk over the renegade Ukraine for a long time” (Izvestia, Nov 25). When 
Yanukovych rejected the association with the EU, “Europe’s political elite lost their face. A 
bacchanalia broke out. Yanukovych was openly teased, humiliated, and literally threatened 
[derzili, khamili, bukvalno ugrozhali]” (Izvestia, Dec 2). Brussels “corners the Eastern Partnership 
countries” to force them into choosing between Russia and the EU (Kommersant, Oct 18). 
Closely related to this “aggressive Europe” category is the narrative that depicts the EU as 
being in a conflict with Russia. It occupies a prominent position in both Kommersant and Izvestia. 
The EU has “an objective to outplay [pereigrat] Russia” in Ukraine (Kommersant, Dec 19); the 
Council of Europe seeks to humiliate Russian pride with its requirements and if the Vilnius 
summit fails, “we will celebrate another diplomatic victory” (Izvestia, Nov 29). Europe, depicted 
as a weakling in most Russian newspapers, seems nearly doomed to fail everywhere: over 
Ukraine, the US spying affair, Syria, the South Stream project or just anything else. In the end, 
“the most admired European,” according to Izvestia, is Vladimir Putin himself (Jan 15). 
It is especially worth noting that the Russian newspapers are keen on using extremely 
emotionalized language speaking about the EU, which constructs Europe as unsure of itself and 
almost hysterical: “the experience of Uruguay scares Europeans” (Jan 23), “Europe is afraid of 
Russia” (Jan 15), “shock and anxiety [trepet], disappointment and irritation in European 
capitals,” Europe “sulks” (Nov 25) – Izvestia; “entire Europe embittered against the US” (Oct 
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Figure 3. Categories for Ukrainian media 
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To some extent, the narrative of conflict is also present in the Ukrainian media, at least in 
Korrespondent which portrays external reactions to the Ukrainian situation as a clash between 
Brussels and Moscow. But what really defines the dominant Ukrainian view of Europe are the 
categories of a successful and advanced society, a symbolic Europe of values which imposes 
“attaining Europe” as both a task of and a path to modernization. The Ukrainian coverage of 
Europe is as positive as the Russian is negative. Europe is a vessel of “the European standards” 
(Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Nov 15), it is also a “resource” of investment (Korrespondent, Nov 26). One 
Korrespondent columnist, a chief executive of a news agency, compared on May 31 the EU to a 
bourgeois family that “renovated its apartment in a European way, with comfortable furniture 
and good house appliances, and lives peacefully and safely,” unlike Ukraine and Russia that 
resemble down-and-out dysfunctional families living in filthy holes. However, Europe can be 
idealized and criticized at the same time. 
When we say “European choice”, we mean political orientation and material abundance. In 
fact, this implies the choice of the most vital values, freedom, human rights, rule of law. 
The Western world is far from ideal. It is diverse. Its freedom often borders on lewdness. 
Its democracy is sometimes a caricature. Its liberalism often means lack of principles. 
(Yevhen Sverstiuk, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Oct 11) 
Against the Europe of values background, Ukraine is perceived as deficiently European, its 
condition as the lack of Europe: 
Europeans and people from Pechersk hills [Ukraine’s ruling elite] speak different languages. 
They are not from different worlds, they are from different planets. “We’re absolutely 
incompatible!” one European diplomat admitted in despair. Of course you are! Some [the 
Europeans] speak of principles and values and are used to trusting each other’s word. 
Especially the one given at the presidential level. The others [Ukrainian elite] only believe in 
and act according to the laws of the criminal world. (Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Nov 15) 
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These values constitute the symbolic Europe and thus empower those who can associate 
with them to speak from a position of authority. By “right of birth” these are Western European 
countries and the EU as these countries’ alliance and fulfillment of those same values. Europe 
controls and monitors the actions of Ukraine’s elite; it is in the eyes of the EU that Putin wants 
to discredit Ukraine (Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Dec 13). Europe is also empowered to decide on how well 
Ukraine completes Europe as its self-assigned task. Europe is, in some cases, also the center 
where the most interesting and topical trends are to be found. 
This portrayal of Europe seems to be endemic to Ukrainian media. In Russia, there was 
only one case that activated such discourse, also in Ukrainian context (a telling detail!), stating 
that “many Ukrainians wish to integrate into Europe with its greater stability, better developed 
institutions, welfare and security” (Kommersant, Dec 3). For the Polish newspapers, Europe 
appears in its symbolic dress only when articles concern the EU enlargement (and, it seems, only 
in Rzeczpospolita). It also helps Poland distinguish itself from Russia: 
That state [Russia] did not have Middle Ages, gothic architecture, nor took part in the 
conflict of the faculties. It developed neither the respectable bourgeoisie, nor the nobility. 
Tsar looked on everything from above, besides God, keeping his people in fear and 
obedience. (Jan 18) 
The relations of Europe with Russia are seldom portrayed on conflictual terms; more often 
the newspapers refer to the Russian influence outside the framework of open conflict, for 
example: 
By overturning the table on which the association agreement must have been signed, 
Ukraine’s government confirmed the opinion of those European politicians who believed 
Yanukovych leads Europe a pretty dance to bargain as much as possible from Russia. 
(Gazeta wyborcza, Nov 22) 
Figure 4. Categories for Polish media 
Gazeta wyborcza 
Europe as unity Europe in distress 
(Crisis) 
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What the Polish newspapers bring is some, albeit limited, attention to history and culture, 
mainly in the form of entertaining life stories (e.g., the one on Europe’s most famous cemeteries; 
in this case rather a death than life story though). More significant is another Poland-specific 
category, the European institutions. It is already present on the periphery of some Ukrainian 
articles, but in the Polish newspapers it is much broader and enriched with a perspective from 
within the EU. Polish journalists indeed report Europe in much greater detail with attention to 
many more subtleties than their Eastern colleagues do. Not only do they mention internal 
divisions and disagreements in the EU, but they also explain at great length where the common 
interest prevails, where particularism is stronger and what is the most likely final outcome. In 
Rzeczpospolita, Europe gets its moment of luck with rather optimistic reportage on the early signs 
of recovery from the crisis, the EU’s great potential (mostly seen as unfulfilled) and its successes 
(such as the new space mission—Jan 25). 
While Russia isolates itself from Europe and Ukraine accepts it as a task, Poland in many 
cases reports the EU events with a sense of shared responsibility, yet in many cases also chooses 
to oppose itself to Europe. Such is the article “Europe opens, Poland closes” (Rzeczpospolita, Oct 
25) on different closing times policies in the retail of various countries, or, as one sees in another 
text: “Poland is one of the few countries [in the EU] that do not sell passports” (Rzeczpospolita, 
Dec 21). 
The enquiry into emerging online public sphere confirms these findings. During the fall and 
winter, the blog section at Ukrainska pravda became a hub of discussion on the association with 
the EU. In itself, it is a site where many public figures (politicians, analysts, writers, artists, 
lawyers, activists and journalists) have their diaries and which sets an agenda for the political and 
cultural debate to some extent. What is seen here is the use of Europe as a “reference point,” in 
the words of Orlova; in his blog entries, Vadym Kolesnichenko (2014), one of the most hated 
pro-Russian MP’s and a staunch Yanukovych supporter, demanded on the ground of the 
European Parliament resolutions that the Ukrainian rightists who celebrated the birthday of 
Stepan Bandera, a historical figure associated with their movement, should be punished. He 
entitled his much earlier entry “The future belongs to the united Europe” (Kolesnichenko, 
2013). If the “Eurosceptical” members of the Ukrainian elite were this pro-European in their 
discursive imitations, one should not wonder why one of the Maidan protesters’ slogans went 
“UkrainEUkraine”. 
This enthusiasm for Europe radiates from the blogs written in the earlier stage of the 
protest. Pro-opposition journalist Serhiy Andrushko explained “Why our politicians do not want 
to integrate in the EU,” citing numerous well-known examples of the Yanukovych regime 
corruption: “Being in the EU means transparent tender procedures. […] Buying raspberry for 70 
euros [per kilo] or a subway bench at the price of an inexpensive car will be impossible. […] 
Look at how MEPs report the gifts they receive” (Andrushko, 2013). One of the protest leaders 
Yuri Lutsenko summarized this even more sharply: “Europe is a system of relations where a man 
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[liudyna—literally, “a person,” “a human being”] is the center of power. Everything works 
towards the man [liudyna]” (Lutsenko, 2013). 
The trend was however sad for Europe. As the protest went on without any tangible 
support from the EU, the discussions in January 2014 became more sober if somber. “Europe is 
responsible for violence in Kyiv because of its inaction and silent observation” (Sokolenko, 
2014), one activist and journalist exclaimed. “Neither government nor Europe hear us, people 
are forced to resort to uprising as the last option. So, we urge Europe to intervene and impose 
sanctions. If Europe just stands by watching, we can repeat Munich 1938.” As a final chord, the 
frontman of one of Ukraine’s leading rock bands wrote: “Stop referring to the protest as ‘pro-
European’. Europe doesn’t give a shit about us. And it’s not about her anyways” (Iarmola, 2014). 
So when an alleged conversation among the US officials was leaked supposedly by the Russian 
special services, the scandalous “f**k the EU” tagline became a permanent topic for countless 
jokes, demotivators, and other urban lore in social media. 
Bloggers at the important Russian blog platform Snob.ru reiterated the same apocalyptic and 
agonistic discourses as their country’s mainstream media. Anecdotic evidence suggests that 
Russian web space is already abundant with half-invented stories about the West’s moral decay, 
juvenile justice, gay prides for kids, and other symptoms of the Untergang of Geyropa (“Gayrope”, 
an ironic reference of the Russian conservatives to the European understanding of human 
rights). With Snob.ru, one could recently see entries on the idea of Europe being destroyed by the 
US and Russia (Tikhomirov, 2013), an open question on whether Jews are really fleeing Norway 
because of the xenophobic Muslim migrants (Ianov, 2013a), reflections on the geopolitical mega-
fight for Ukraine between the EU and Russia (Timofeiev, 2013) and on French neo-colonialism 
in Africa (Tikhonov, 2013). Eduard Limonov, the leader of Russia’s National Bolsheviks and a 
nearly modern classic writer, suggested: “In fact, it would be good for us if Europe broke down. 
It is in our interests, in the interests of Russia to support the migrants in Europe against the 
European indigenous populations to weaken Europe” (Limonov, 2013). At the same time, the 
difference from the printed media is that on Internet one can also find examples (e.g., Morozov, 
2013) of the symbolic use of Europe as the source of values and righteous practices. One 
blogger dwelled on how the idea of Europe coincides with that of political modernization 
(Ianov, 2013b). Importantly, the website launched a series of articles entitled “Why Russia lags 
behind Europe.” 
Poland may lack any single most prestigious blog platform that takes part in agenda-setting 
and framing the most important issues. Most blogs at the news outlets’ websites are run by the 
journalists who work for them. So Dziennik opinii at the leftist intellectual publication Krytyka 
polityczna is rather a poor substitute. However, it is interesting to note Europe was not a 
prominent topic at it in 2013. Few opinion pieces that referred to it focused on the EU’s internal 
crisis and some aspects of the then on-going Ukrainian protests—interestingly, the latter by a 
Ukrainian author (Radynski, 2014). 
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But the observation of Polish newspapers alone leads to an interesting conclusion. One 
practice extremely typical for both Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta wyborcza is the generalization of 
Europe. The article often contains a story from just one, maybe two countries, which are still 
generalized as representative for Europe in the headline and/or lead. Examples are Gazeta 
articles “Europe Homo+” (April 24) on the legalization of gay marriage in France or “Europe 
protects its culture from the US” (June 5) on new French measures to close the markets for 
American cultural product. Although these stories may have some significance for other 
European countries, there is nothing in them that allows assuming it is about more than just 
national action. The “Europe” of these articles is rather a figure of speech, in this case a 
synecdoche which substitutes the whole with its part (or vice versa). 
This says volumes about how Europe is used in the three countries’ media discourses, more 
specifically how they differ in the use of it. The primary difference lies in how they use Europe 
as a linguistic device. Overloaded with different meanings, the word “Europe” functions as a 
semantically empty trope; Europe is not “what,” it is “how.” Broadly speaking, it is most likely a 
metonymy in which something is called by the name of something else that is closely associated 
with it instead of being called by the name of its own. For Poland, a part of the EU, this part can 
more easily substitute the whole in a synecdoche (which is often seen as a form of metonymy). 
Ukraine prefers ordinary metonymy, using Europe as shorthand for the values and practices it 
sees as important, useful and vital for its own survival, just because the values originated in 
Europe and are associated with it. Russia pushes the limits of metonymy further to the brink of 
metaphor where anything at all can substitute for anything else, perhaps reaching the catachresis, 
an extreme form of metaphor, literally “an abuse” of a word used arbitrarily without any 
connection to its semantic context, therefore facilitating the construction of the stories of 
decline-and-fall or epic battle that are metaphoric if hyperbolic. 
There is of course a more down-to-earth explanation for this. Polish newspapers see 
Europe from within and have a more precise idea about it; this is perhaps one of the reasons for 
the presence of institutional and market aspects (they entail more precise definition of Europe). 
What is Europe is clearly defined and demarcated (see Figure 4). In Russia and Ukraine, these 
criteria are more blurred and therefore more metonymic and even catachrestic. If the aspect of 
values and authority dominates in Ukraine, Russia sees Europe from the perspective of conflict 
and geopolitical game where Europe is the losing side. 
The conclusions of this paper include three main points: 1) journalists in each of the three 
countries agree that Europe has primarily geographical and institutional dimensions; 2) although 
all newspapers more or less agree that Europe acts as a political subject and faces hardly its best 
times, there are vast differences in the main angles of how Europe has been reported; Russians 
focus on the dramatic crisis in the EU along with the perceived “aggressiveness” of Brussels, 
while Ukrainians strongly prefer symbolic understanding (Europe of values; Europe as self-
assigned modernization task) and Poles are unique in their attention to the institutional 
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framework of the EU; 3) these differences are likely related to the political status of each country 
as regards Europe and at the same time to their discrepant uses of language on Europe, not only 
with different semantic but with different rhetorical form as well, suggesting a variation from 
synecdoche in Poland to metonymy in Ukraine to catachresis in Russia. For all three, Europe is a 
figure of speech rather than meaning. 
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